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Gambling is a lucrative source of revenue for
governments, since it is capable of producing
revenue outside “normal” taxation. The global
gambling expansion that has occurred within
last few decades has not always been in the best
interests of the citizenry, but it has been more a
result of government–industry partnerships to
raise public income (Adams, 2008; Nelson &
Mason, 2007; Orford, 2011). Social concern
about gambling has been replaced with respon-
sibility for personal choice (Panasitti & Schull,
1994; Nikkinen & Marionneau, 2014). Much
gambling consumption is, however, involun-
tary, and gambling is one of the “coercive
commodities” (Young & Markham, 2017).
Those who gamble excessively contribute to
gambling taxes disproportionally. Up to 60%
of the proceeds of gambling are collected from
those categorised as “problem” gamblers
(Schull, 2012). Decreasing gambling-related
harm therefore also decreases profits, since the
total consumption model (TCM) appears to
apply to gambling (Rossow, 2019; Sulkunen
et al., 2019).
Recognising that the majority of gambling
revenues are collected from a small segment
of the population that bears much of the harm,
one could ask whether collection and use of
gambling taxes (although they are often
labelled as “proceeds”, in practice they are
taxes: see Clotfelter, 2005) create problems of
their own. In many European countries, gam-
bling taxes are added to the state budget, but
there are also several in which the proceeds
(read: taxes) are earmarked to be used for cer-
tain “good causes”, as in Finland and Norway.
When earmarking and hypothecated taxes are
used, there is stronger justification for gambling
(Egerer, Marionneau, & Nikkinen (Eds.),
2018).
Imposing hypothecated taxes on addictive
products has been viewed as a feasible alterna-
tive to cover the costs of the (inevitable) indi-
vidual and social harm the consumption of
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these products causes. The popularity of
hypothecated taxation in relation to tobacco,
alcohol and gambling is explained by reasoning
that non-users should not be forced to cover the
costs of other people’s poor lifestyle choices.
However, since the ideological basis of the Nor-
dic welfare state is based on solidarity and
equity, it is possible to question whether
hypothecated taxation is the best option for
addressing gambling-related harm. Although
hypothecated taxation has its benefits, such as
that it can be earmarked for designated pur-
poses, including problem gambling research
and treatment, it also has its drawbacks.
The applicability of the total consumption
model to gambling together with hypothecated
taxes means that profits increase along with
harm. This also works in the other direction:
research and treatment professionals face
decreases in their funding if the problems and
proceeds decrease. The governmental agency
allocating the funding can frame the gambling
problem in such a manner that ensures the con-
tinuous flow of funds (Adams, 2016). Gam-
bling industry actors are able to build
relationships with officials in charge of allocat-
ing gambling proceeds and have their say on
how they are used (on the grounds that they are
the ones who produce the profits). The benefi-
ciaries of gambling funds form strong lobby
organisations, and this applies also to Nordic
countries (Egerer et al. (eds.), 2018).
Without strong lobby organisations and gov-
ernment protection, and when researchers and
treatment professionals also have an interest in
a continuous flow of gambling proceeds, it is
understandable that those with gambling prob-
lems feel increasingly isolated and hopeless
(Orford, 2013). When the government has a
gambling monopoly, the government is the
operator and acts against the interests of some
of its citizens, i.e., those labelled as “gambling
addicts” (Orford, 2011). Framing problem gam-
bling as individual vulnerability, the govern-
ment can continue business with monopoly
operators, and in this, the notion of the
“problem gambler” as a political construct is
useful: few individuals are unable to control
their gambling and most people can gamble
“responsibly”, without problems (Boyce,
2019; Cassidy, Loussouarn, & Pisac, 2013).
This hinders the discussion about whether gam-
bling products and services are inherently dan-
gerous (Orford, 2011).
For researchers, the most serious issue is that
the source of funding, hypothecated taxation,
may also influence the research questions
asked, and the subsequent results. When we
explored 45 articles about gambling advertising
in sport (Hellman et al., unpublished), in the
articles the problem was mostly viewed as the
ubiquity of gambling and the “gamblification”
of sport. Approximately one-third of these arti-
cles (N ¼ 16) were funded by hypothecated
gambling taxes (it should be noted that in many
cases, the funding source was not immediately
evident or available). It was recognised that
there is far too much gambling advertising, and
its impact on adolescents was worrisome for
researchers (e.g., Hing, Vitartas, Lamont, &
Fink, 2014). Although the articles recognised
that something should be done, they were
mostly silent about the most efficient measures
to prevent harm in the future. In tobacco
research, the complete advertising/sponsoring
ban at sports events was imposed in the EU
from 2005. Now gambling advertising has
replaced tobacco advertisements, and Finland’s
premier football league (for example) is now
known as the Veikkaus (national monopoly
operator in Finland) League. In Sweden, fol-
lowing the licensing of online gambling in
2019, the Kindred Group is a new sponsor of
premier football and ice hockey leagues, ending
the era of Svenska Spel sponsoring them in the
role of national monopoly operator. (In foot-
ball, Svenska Spel had been the head sponsor
from 1934.) In order to enhance prevention, an
understandable step forward would be to follow
the example of tobacco, and impose a general
ban on sports gambling advertising. However,
in studies related to advertising sport venues
funded by hypothecated taxation, this option
is often not considered at all. The role of
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prevention has long been recognised in alcohol
and tobacco, but in gambling, according to
Heather Wardle and her colleagues, the current
approach to targeting the already harmed indi-
viduals seriously underestimates the harm gam-
bling causes (Wardle, Reith, Langham, &
Rogers, 2019). Although writing in the UK con-
text, their call for population-based approaches
to changing regulation and funding practices
should also be considered in Nordic countries.
Currently it seems that the “gamblification” of
leisure time, including sports, alongside the
general normalisation of gambling in everyday
life environments (such as the placement of
“electronic gaming machines” (EGMs) in gro-
cery shops and kiosks in Finland) combined
with hypothecated taxation, creates a situation
in which the public health approach is not easily
applied.
What should be addressed in tandem with
focusing on protecting public health and pre-
vention in relation to gambling, is the issue of
gambling research funding. As has already been
noted in several publications and editorials,
there is a danger of bias when gambling
research is funded through industry funding.
The editorial by Thomas Babor and Peter Miller
in Addiction in 2014 noted that much of the
research provided by National Center for
Responsible Gambling (NCRG) in the US
(sponsored by the American Gaming Associa-
tion, industry advocate), failed to declare their
funding source (Babor & Miller, 2014). Miller
and his colleagues have also produced a more
detailed evaluation of NCRG funding (Miller,
Carter, & Groot, 2012). In this evaluation, an
article by Harvard-affiliated Howard Shaffer
and David Korn (Shaffer & Korn, 2002) was
seemingly using a public health approach, but
it framed the issue of problem gambling in a
manner that it avoided “ . . . any mention of the
most effective public health measures
employed in the most relevant comparative dis-
orders (tobacco and alcohol), that is restricting
access, availability and advertising” (Miller
et al., 2012, p. 290).
In their editorial in International Gambling
Studies in 2017 Charles Livingstone and his
colleagues also noted that large gambling com-
panies have been able to influence government
policies and gambling researchers, including
“research priorities, agendas and outcomes”
(Livingstone et al., 2018). In the Nordic coun-
tries, the gambling industry does not exert its
influence directly, as it does in the UK and the
US. The influence is more indirect, and mono-
poly operators in particular use the discourse of
“responsible gambling” to legitimate their busi-
ness. The prevailing model is that prevalence
studies are conducted with a large opportunity
cost, in order to show that only a small propor-
tion of gamblers are “addicted”, and politicians’
inaction may therefore be justified (for exam-
ple, gambling proceeds are often used to sup-
port youth organizations of political parties,
especially in Sweden and Finland) (Living-
stone, 2013).
The problem is structural: no individual
researcher or research group should be placed
in a position in which they are unable to con-
duct gambling research or to attend conferences
unless they accept gambling industry support
for their research and travel. In a similar man-
ner, academic conferences should be free of
industry influence, and gambling companies
should be denied a platform, especially in pub-
lic health and addiction conferences (Living-
stone, 2017). Currently there are few
opportunities for gambling researchers in terms
of research funding. Most rely on short-term
grants from a small number of agencies. This
problem has been recognised by Peter Miller
and Kypros Kypri in relation to alcohol
research, where the industry is able to exert its
influence (Miller & Kypri, 2009). The situation
with gambling research is the same. With short-
term funding being derived from hypothecated
taxation, novice researchers in particular
unconsciously accept the paradigm that a gov-
ernment monopoly would be the best option for
tackling gambling-related harm. This might be
the case, but for the moment, it remains to be
proven.
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